To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest.
Introduction
In many contest environments, the total number of players is limited, but players can choose between sending one or several agents to compete in a contest. For instance, in car races teams can send one or two cars into the race. In R&D contests, …rms may have just one research laboratory or may divisionalize their research activities, installing several independent research units. More importantly, in markets in which price competition is e¤ectively ruled out and all competition occurs via upfront sunk sales e¤orts, …rms may decide to have only one sales department, or they may divisionalize and choose competing sales agencies. Two examples are the market for prescription drugs in countries in which price competition for drugs is e¤ectively eliminated due to the indirect payment arrangements of the health care system, and the highly regulated pre-1994 insurance market in many European countries. Rees and Kessner (1999) .
little evidence for divisionalization in the market for prescription drugs, whereas, in the insurance market, some big …rms owned several smaller insurance companies who contested for customers with each other and with the rest of the market and some companies even employed a number of sales agencies that cannibalized on each other.
In this paper we address the question whether divisionalization is pro…table. We disregard aspects such as intra-…rm governance problems and competing divisions as an In a related context, Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996) considered whether …rms can gain from divisionalization in a Cournot oligopoly. The divisionalizing …rm gains and overall pro…ts in this industry are reduced. Divisionalization in contests has similar e¤ects as regards total pro…ts, but whether the divisionalizing …rm gains depends on the number of competitors and on the characteristics of the contest.
Contests
Let N be the set of …rms, with #N = n: Suppose that each of these …rms has one contestant in a contest that makes an e¤ort to win some prize of size B. Each contestant i chooses contest e¤ort x i 2 [0; 1) which cannot be recovered, whether the contestant wins or not. Contest e¤orts determine contestants' probabilities q i of winning the prize, according to a contest success function
This function has been suggested by Tullock (1980) and axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) . The coe¢cient a in (1) measures how much the contest outcome can be in ‡uenced by contest e¤ort, and is called the discriminatory power of the contest success function. For instance, if a ! 0, each contestant has the same chance of winning, irrespective of contest e¤orts. If, instead, a ! 1, (1) approaches a contest success function in which the contestant who makes the highest e¤ort wins for sure. We limit the discriminatory power to a 2 [0; n n¡1 ) in order to have well-behaved optimization problems with equilibria in pure strategies and …rst-order conditions characterizing these equilibria. 2
Firms are risk neutral. Suppose there is no incentive problem between …rms and contestants. They maximize …rms' payo¤s
Firm i wins the prize B with probability q i and its contestant spends contest e¤ort equal to x i . The …rst-order condition for a payo¤ maximum and symmetry can be used to calculate the contest equilibrium e¤orts
with n being the number of contestants. The equilibrium probability of winning is 1=n
for each contestant, yielding the equilibrium payo¤s as
3 Fully non-cooperative divisions Suppose …rm n decides to divisionalize, i.e., to send two divisions to the contest and provides each division with incentives to maximize payo¤ as in (2). Divisionalization increases the set of contestants from f1; :::; ng = N to f1; :::; n 1 ; n 2 g = N d . We denote f1; :::; (n ¡ 1)g´S and fn 1 ; n 2 g´D. The latter is the set of divisions of …rm n. Divisionalization is pro…table if the equilibrium payo¤ of the two divisions in the contest with n + 1 participants exceeds the payo¤ of one participant in a contest with n participants. This is the case if ¼ ¤ (n) < 2¼ ¤ (n + 1), or, using (4), if (n + 1)(n ¡ 1)n n 3 ¡ n 2 + n + 1 > a.
Denote the left hand side of (5) by a 0 (n) and note that a 0 (n) 2 (0; n n¡1 ). Hence, Proposition 1 For a given total number n of …rms there is a critical discriminatory power a 0 (n) 2 (0; n n¡1 ) such that divisionalization by one …rm is pro…table for this …rm if and only if a < a 0 (n).
Intuitively, if the discriminatory power is very small, e.g., close to zero, then total e¤ort becomes negligible in comparison to the prize. Accordingly, each …rm earns almost B=n if it does not divisionalize, and almost 2B=(n + 1) if it divisionalizes.
We also note that divisionalization reduces total industry pro…ts, as n¼ ¤ (n) in (4) is declining in n.
Cooperative divisions
If divisionalization occurs within a …rm, the …rm's divisions' e¤orts may be coordinated by a higher level decision making unit that takes into account that the contest e¤ort in one division also reduces the other division's probability of winning.
In this case the total e¤ect of divisionalization can be obtained analytically in two steps. First, suppose the new divisions behave non-cooperatively. This e¤ect has been determined in section 3. We call this the team size e¤ect because it is based on the increased number of …rm n's contestants. Second, divisions' choices of e¤ort may be coordinated. We call this the collusion e¤ect. To analyse the collusion e¤ect we start with a situation in which all contestants in N d behave non-cooperatively and ask if the two divisions n 1 and n 2 can increase their joint pro…ts if they choose their e¤orts cooperatively.
If divisions maximize …rm pro…t (q n 1 + q n 2 )B ¡ x n 1 ¡ x n 2 , they take into account @q i @x j < 0 for i 6 = j, and therefore, coordination makes them reduce their e¤ort compared to x ¤ (n + 1). This decrease is anticipated by contestants k 2 S. Let »(¹ x) be the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium e¤ort choices of divisions n i 2 D, for given e¤ort choices x j = ¹
x for all j 2 S, and similarly, ¹ »(x) the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium e¤ort choices of all contestants j 2 S for given e¤ort choices x n i = x for n i 2 D. These functions could, in principle, be obtained analytically from solving the …rst-order conditions for fully non-cooperative …rms,
for x as a function of ¹ x, with x the non-cooperative e¤ort level chosen by all contestants in D for given uniform e¤ort levels ¹ x by all contestants j 2 S, and vice versa for ¹ x as a function of x. The intersection of these two curves characterizes the Nash equilibrium with x i = x j = x ¤ (n + 1) = aBn=(n + 1) 2 for all i; j 2 N d by (3). For i 2 S, (6) can be rewritten as a¹ x a¡1 [(n ¡ 2)¹ x a + 2x a ]B = [(n ¡ 1)¹ x a + 2x a ] 2 . At the equilibrium value
x ¤ , by di¤erentiating this condition totally and making use of (3), the slope of ¹ »(x) can be obtained as
Lemma 1 ¹ » 0 (x) < 0 and lim a!0 ¹ » 0 (x) = 0 at x = ¹ x = x ¤ (n + 1).
For a proof of Lemma 1 observe that the numerator of (7) is positive and the denominator of (7) is negative for a · n n¡1 and converges toward ¡1 for a ! 0. The intuition for the limit property in Lemma 1 is as follows. By (6), for a ! 0 each contestant's marginal bene…t from e¤ort becomes in…nitely small. Hence, a contestant would not like to spend much, even if other contestants spend huge amounts.
Using the envelope theorem and the fact that @¼ i @x k = ¡ 1 n for i 6 = k at the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the pro…t is higher for each division if they jointly reduce their contest e¤ort x starting from x = ¹ x = x ¤ (n + 1) if
A joint decrease in their e¤orts increases their pro…ts if the mutual direct e¤ect of reduced e¤ort among the divisions outweighs the equilibrium reactions by all other contestants. The inequality in (8) to be ful…lled is a necessary condition for collusion to be pro…table. It resembles the condition that has been derived in Gaudet and Salant (1991) The intuition for the result in Proposition 2 is as follows. Collusion on contest e¤ort leads to a reduction in e¤ort for the set of colluders. If this reduction in e¤ort does not trigger an increase in other contestants' e¤orts, collusion is bene…cial. As has been shown in Lemma 1, other contestants react by increases in their e¤ort, but this reaction is very moderate if the discriminatory power of the contest is su¢ciently low.
Conclusions
In this paper we consider the pro…tability of divisionalization in contests. We distinguish between a team size e¤ect and a collusion e¤ect and show that with high discriminatory power the team size e¤ect of divisionalization reduces pro…ts and the collusion e¤ect is ambiguous, but both e¤ects increase pro…ts if the discriminatory power in the contest is low.
